![]() So it should safeguard against such mistakes.Ī checksum would provide a baseline verification that a given target (version, os, arch, etc) is valid, which is generally a good thing and is universally accepted as best practice just because a given best practice "could" be compromised, doesn't mean that we shouldn't follow it. The largest browsers (even IE, I think?) now come with in their "HSTS preload" lists, which force the browser to always use HTTPS and prevent the user from bypassing certificate errors. To avoid that, don't bypass those browser security warnings. If you open a HTTPS website but the attacker intercepts your connection (MITM), the browser will warn you about a certificate error (since the attacker cannot get a "real" certificate for ), but many people will just blindly "click through" those warnings without even looking. (I know Tor has a port whitelist for exit nodes, but it would certainly be useful to have one for clients as well.) To avoid that, make sure you only visit the download pages over HTTPS there might be some Tor configuration that you could use to block HTTP (tcp/80) entirely. If you start with and expect to be automatically redirected to HTTPS, an attacker can strip this redirect and force you to stay on the HTTP version. kind of what HTTPS is supposed to prevent. I understand the download is via an HTTPS connection, but correct me if I'm wrong it would still be possible to inject a malicious download right? deb from, then likewise you couldn't trust that you obtained the right PGP keys from either.) Why couldn't they inject fake "checksums" as well? If you cannot trust that you downloaded the right. Consider this: If you think an attacker can inject a fake download. The Linux repositories are signed using GPG – when you first download the b over HTTPS, it automatically adds the updates repository to sources.list and installs its signing key to your apt configuration (see /opt/google/chrome/cron/). ![]() Automatic updates (delivered using Omaha) are also signed using X.509. ![]() The Windows installers are signed using Authenticode (X.509), which is verified natively by Windows itself. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |